Why do some new insider ceos make more strategic changes than others?

Qi Zhu, Songcui Hu, Wei Shen

Research output: Chapter in book / Conference proceedingConference article published in proceeding or bookAcademic researchpeer-review

Abstract

Moving beyond the focus of prior research on the difference between insider and outsider CEOs, the current study draws attention to the question why some new insider CEOs make more strategic changes than others by systematically investigating the effect of their prior experience on corporate boards. We theorize and find that new insider CEOs’ prior experience on other boards has a positive effect on post-succession strategic change, while their prior experience on the focal board not only has a negative main effect but also weakens the positive effect of prior experience on other boards. Our study contributes to upper echelons theory and research on CEO origin, and has important implications for practices regarding CEO succession and strategic change.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAOM Annual Meeting Proceedings 2019
Volume2019
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2019
Externally publishedYes
Event79th Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management: Understanding the Inclusive Organization, AOM 2019 - Boston, United States
Duration: 9 Aug 201913 Aug 2019

Conference

Conference79th Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management: Understanding the Inclusive Organization, AOM 2019
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityBoston
Period9/08/1913/08/19

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Management Information Systems
  • Management of Technology and Innovation
  • Industrial relations

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