Truthful multi-unit multi-attribute double auctions for perishable supply chain trading

Meng Cheng, Su Xiu Xu, George Q. Huang

Research output: Journal article publicationJournal articleAcademic researchpeer-review

31 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper aims to propose multi-attribute double auctions for perishable supply chain trading (PSCT). We first construct a multi-unit/single-unit multi-attribute double auction (MS-MDA) for PSCT where suppliers can submit bids on a single unit of one item (i.e., single output restriction). We then relax the single output restriction and propose a multi-unit multi-attribute double auction (M-MDA) for PSCT in which each supplier offers multiple units of one item. Both the MS-MDA and M-MDA mechanisms are incentive compatible, individually rational, budget balanced and computationally efficient. The computational study shows that all proposed mechanisms are of high allocation efficiency and practically implementable.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)21-37
Number of pages17
JournalTransportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review
Volume93
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sept 2016
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Incentive compatibility
  • Mechanism design
  • Multi-attribute double auctions
  • Perishable supply chain trading

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business and International Management
  • Civil and Structural Engineering
  • Transportation

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