The real effects of disclosure regulation: Evidence from mandatory CFO compensation disclosure

Research output: Journal article publicationJournal articleAcademic researchpeer-review


The 2006 SEC rule, by changing the definition of Named Executive Officers, mandates CFO compensation disclosure. Using this setting and a difference-in-differences research design, we study the real effects of CFO compensation disclosure regulation on CFO job performance. We hypothesize that the disclosure of CFO compensation information, by facilitating shareholder monitoring of the board in providing appropriate incentives to CFOs, leads to better CFO job performance in providing high-quality financial reports. The analyses support our prediction: the treatment firms, which start disclosing CFO compensation information under the 2006 rule, compared to the control firms, which already disclose CFO compensation before 2006, experience an improvement in CFO performance, as exhibited in decreases in accounting misstatements and unexplained audit fees. The results are more pronounced for firms with concentrated ownership, smaller compensation committees, and CFOs subject to weaker monitoring by audit committees. Overall, we provide evidence of a real effect resulting from mandatory CFO compensation disclosure.

Original languageEnglish
Article number106995
JournalJournal of Accounting and Public Policy
Issue number6
Publication statusPublished - 1 Nov 2022

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Sociology and Political Science


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