The market for shareholder voting rights around mergers and acquisitions: Evidence from institutional daily trading and voting

Jennifer E. Bethel, Gang Hu, Qinghai Wang

Research output: Journal article publicationJournal articleAcademic researchpeer-review

32 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper explores the market for voting rights and shareholder voting around 350 mergers and acquisitions between 1999 and 2005 by examining institutional-investor trading and voting outcomes. Our results show institutions in aggregate buy shares and hence voting rights before merger record dates. This trading is not related to proxies for merger arbitrage or trading around merger announcements, and thus is not simply a continuation of the latter. Trading and buying before record dates are positively related to voting turnout and negatively related to shareholder support of merger proposals. We explore several possible interpretations of these results.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)129-145
Number of pages17
JournalJournal of Corporate Finance
Volume15
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Feb 2009
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Institutions
  • Shareholder voting rights
  • Trading

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business and International Management
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Strategy and Management

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