The least-core and nucleolus of path cooperative games

Qizhi Fang; Bo Li; Xiaohan Shan; Xiaoming Sun

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-21398-9_6

The least-core and nucleolus of path cooperative games

Qizhi Fang, Bo Li, Xiaohan Shan, Xiaoming Sun

Research output: Chapter in book / Conference proceeding › Conference article published in proceeding or book › Academic research › peer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Cooperative games provide an appropriate framework for fair and stable profit distribution in multiagent systems. In this paper, we study the algorithmic issues on path cooperative games that arise from the situations where some commodity flows through a network. In these games, a coalition of edges or vertices is successful if they establish a path from the source to the sink in the network, and lose otherwise. Based on dual theory of linear programming and the relationship with flow games, we provide the characterizations on the CS-core, least-core and nucleolus of path cooperative games. Furthermore, we show that the least-core and nucleolus are polynomially solvable for path cooperative games defined on both directed and undirected network.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Computing and Combinatorics - 21st International Conference, COCOON 2015, Proceedings
Editors	Dachuan Xu, Donglei Du, Dingzhu Du
Publisher	Springer Verlag
Pages	70-82
Number of pages	13
ISBN (Print)	9783319213972
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21398-9_6
Publication status	Published - 2015
Externally published	Yes
Event	21st International Conference on Computing and Combinatorics Conference, COCOON 2015 - Beijing, China Duration: 4 Aug 2015 → 6 Aug 2015

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	9198
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	21st International Conference on Computing and Combinatorics Conference, COCOON 2015
Country/Territory	China
City	Beijing
Period	4/08/15 → 6/08/15

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Theoretical Computer Science
General Computer Science

More information

10.1007/978-3-319-21398-9_6

Cite this

Fang, Q., Li, B., Shan, X., & Sun, X. (2015). The least-core and nucleolus of path cooperative games. In D. Xu, D. Du, & D. Du (Eds.), Computing and Combinatorics - 21st International Conference, COCOON 2015, Proceedings (pp. 70-82). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 9198). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21398-9_6

Fang, Qizhi ; Li, Bo ; Shan, Xiaohan et al. / The least-core and nucleolus of path cooperative games. Computing and Combinatorics - 21st International Conference, COCOON 2015, Proceedings. editor / Dachuan Xu ; Donglei Du ; Dingzhu Du. Springer Verlag, 2015. pp. 70-82 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).

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abstract = "Cooperative games provide an appropriate framework for fair and stable profit distribution in multiagent systems. In this paper, we study the algorithmic issues on path cooperative games that arise from the situations where some commodity flows through a network. In these games, a coalition of edges or vertices is successful if they establish a path from the source to the sink in the network, and lose otherwise. Based on dual theory of linear programming and the relationship with flow games, we provide the characterizations on the CS-core, least-core and nucleolus of path cooperative games. Furthermore, we show that the least-core and nucleolus are polynomially solvable for path cooperative games defined on both directed and undirected network.",

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Fang, Q, Li, B, Shan, X & Sun, X 2015, The least-core and nucleolus of path cooperative games. in D Xu, D Du & D Du (eds), Computing and Combinatorics - 21st International Conference, COCOON 2015, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 9198, Springer Verlag, pp. 70-82, 21st International Conference on Computing and Combinatorics Conference, COCOON 2015, Beijing, China, 4/08/15. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21398-9_6

The least-core and nucleolus of path cooperative games. / Fang, Qizhi; Li, Bo; Shan, Xiaohan et al.
Computing and Combinatorics - 21st International Conference, COCOON 2015, Proceedings. ed. / Dachuan Xu; Donglei Du; Dingzhu Du. Springer Verlag, 2015. p. 70-82 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 9198).

Research output: Chapter in book / Conference proceeding › Conference article published in proceeding or book › Academic research › peer-review

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AB - Cooperative games provide an appropriate framework for fair and stable profit distribution in multiagent systems. In this paper, we study the algorithmic issues on path cooperative games that arise from the situations where some commodity flows through a network. In these games, a coalition of edges or vertices is successful if they establish a path from the source to the sink in the network, and lose otherwise. Based on dual theory of linear programming and the relationship with flow games, we provide the characterizations on the CS-core, least-core and nucleolus of path cooperative games. Furthermore, we show that the least-core and nucleolus are polynomially solvable for path cooperative games defined on both directed and undirected network.

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Fang Q, Li B, Shan X, Sun X. The least-core and nucleolus of path cooperative games. In Xu D, Du D, Du D, editors, Computing and Combinatorics - 21st International Conference, COCOON 2015, Proceedings. Springer Verlag. 2015. p. 70-82. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-21398-9_6

The least-core and nucleolus of path cooperative games

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