The influence of extortion diversity on the evolution of cooperation in scale-free networks

Yajun Mao, Zhihai Rong, Xiongrui Xu, Chi Kong Tse

Research output: Chapter in book / Conference proceedingConference article published in proceeding or bookAcademic researchpeer-review

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Extortion strategies, which can let an individual's surplus exceed her opponent's by a fixed percentage, have played an important role in the understanding of the evolution of cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma game. In this paper, we combine individuals' extortion ability with their degrees, and study the influence of extortion diversity in the heterogeneous scale-free network. Our investigation shows that, when individuals' extortion factors are negative correlation with their degrees, these extortionate hubs play as catalysts to enhance the emergence of cooperative behavior. However, when the extortion factors are positively correlated with degrees, the effect of hub's catalyst is weaken.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationISCAS 2016 - IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems
PublisherIEEE
Pages886-889
Number of pages4
Volume2016-July
ISBN (Electronic)9781479953400
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 29 Jul 2016
Event2016 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems, ISCAS 2016 - Montreal's Sheraton Centre, Montreal, Canada
Duration: 22 May 201625 May 2016

Conference

Conference2016 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems, ISCAS 2016
Country/TerritoryCanada
CityMontreal
Period22/05/1625/05/16

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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