TY - JOUR
T1 - The electric vehicle promotion in the cold-chain logistics under two-sided support policy: An evolutionary game perspective
AU - Zhao, Chuan
AU - Ma, Xuying
AU - Wang, Kun
N1 - Funding Information:
This work was supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China ( 71901004 ); Social Science Project of Beijing Municipal Education Commission of China ( SM202210011004 ); and Excellent Youth Training Program of Beijing Technology and Business University
Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 Elsevier Ltd
PY - 2022/6
Y1 - 2022/6
N2 - Many countries, industries, companies and end consumers have actively switched from fuel cars to electric vehicles (EV) to combat global warming via emission control. However, given cost and research and development uncertainties, refrigerated truck manufacturers (RTMs) and cold-chain logistics enterprises (CCLEs) are hesitant to update and employ electric refrigerated trucks (ERTs). Government support, notably subsidies, is vital in the ERT promotion. Thus, this study investigates the optimal two-sided support policies of the government (i.e. subsidies for CCLEs and RTMs) to explore how it achieves the best incentive for ERT promotion in the cold-chain logistics with limited resources. The study develops an evolutionary game model to analyse the influence of multiple factors on ERT upgrade and penetration strategies, clarify dynamic subsidy policy adjustment measures based on industrial evolution under multiple-factor interactions, and discuss the dynamic adjustment priority of the two-sided subsidy policies. The results indicate that the two-sided hierarchical subsidy policy can improve the promotion of ERTs and stimulate the electrification development of the cold-chain transportation industry. Finally, the decision-making preferences of RTMs and CCLEs in multiple scenarios are discussed and feasible management suggestions for government and enterprises are proposed accordingly.
AB - Many countries, industries, companies and end consumers have actively switched from fuel cars to electric vehicles (EV) to combat global warming via emission control. However, given cost and research and development uncertainties, refrigerated truck manufacturers (RTMs) and cold-chain logistics enterprises (CCLEs) are hesitant to update and employ electric refrigerated trucks (ERTs). Government support, notably subsidies, is vital in the ERT promotion. Thus, this study investigates the optimal two-sided support policies of the government (i.e. subsidies for CCLEs and RTMs) to explore how it achieves the best incentive for ERT promotion in the cold-chain logistics with limited resources. The study develops an evolutionary game model to analyse the influence of multiple factors on ERT upgrade and penetration strategies, clarify dynamic subsidy policy adjustment measures based on industrial evolution under multiple-factor interactions, and discuss the dynamic adjustment priority of the two-sided subsidy policies. The results indicate that the two-sided hierarchical subsidy policy can improve the promotion of ERTs and stimulate the electrification development of the cold-chain transportation industry. Finally, the decision-making preferences of RTMs and CCLEs in multiple scenarios are discussed and feasible management suggestions for government and enterprises are proposed accordingly.
KW - Cold-chain logistics
KW - Electric refrigerated trucks
KW - Evolutionary game
KW - Transportation electrification
KW - Two-sided support policy
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85127313716&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.tranpol.2022.02.003
DO - 10.1016/j.tranpol.2022.02.003
M3 - Journal article
AN - SCOPUS:85127313716
SN - 0967-070X
VL - 121
SP - 14
EP - 34
JO - Transport Policy
JF - Transport Policy
ER -