TY - GEN
T1 - Strong Leakage and Tamper-Resilient PKE from Refined Hash Proof System
AU - Sun, Shi Feng
AU - Gu, Dawu
AU - Au, Man Ho
AU - Han, Shuai
AU - Yu, Yu
AU - Liu, Joseph
N1 - Funding Information:
Acknowledgements. The authors would like to thank all anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments. This work is supported by the National Key R&D Pro- gram of China (No. 2016YFB0801201), the Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 61802255, 61602396, U1636217) and the China Postdoctoral Science Foundation (No. 2017M621472).
Publisher Copyright:
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019.
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - We revisit the problem of constructing public key encryption (PKE) secure against both key-leakage and tampering attacks. First, we present an enhanced security against both kinds of attacks, namely strong leakage and tamper-resilient chosen-ciphertext (sLTR-CCA) security, which imposes only minimal restrictions on the adversary’s queries and thus captures the capability of the adversary in a more reasonable way. Then, we propose a generic paradigm achieving this security on the basis of a refined hash proof system (HPS) called public-key-malleable HPS. The paradigm can not only tolerate a large amount of bounded key-leakage, but also resist an arbitrary polynomial of restricted tampering attacks, even depending on the challenge phase. Moreover, the paradigm with slight adaptations can also be proven sLTR-CCA secure with respect to subexponentially hard auxiliary-input leakage. In addition, we instantiate our paradigm under certain standard number-theoretic assumptions, and thus, to our best knowledge, obtain the first efficient PKE schemes possessing the strong bounded/auxiliary-input leakage and tamper-resilient chosen-ciphertext security in the standard model.
AB - We revisit the problem of constructing public key encryption (PKE) secure against both key-leakage and tampering attacks. First, we present an enhanced security against both kinds of attacks, namely strong leakage and tamper-resilient chosen-ciphertext (sLTR-CCA) security, which imposes only minimal restrictions on the adversary’s queries and thus captures the capability of the adversary in a more reasonable way. Then, we propose a generic paradigm achieving this security on the basis of a refined hash proof system (HPS) called public-key-malleable HPS. The paradigm can not only tolerate a large amount of bounded key-leakage, but also resist an arbitrary polynomial of restricted tampering attacks, even depending on the challenge phase. Moreover, the paradigm with slight adaptations can also be proven sLTR-CCA secure with respect to subexponentially hard auxiliary-input leakage. In addition, we instantiate our paradigm under certain standard number-theoretic assumptions, and thus, to our best knowledge, obtain the first efficient PKE schemes possessing the strong bounded/auxiliary-input leakage and tamper-resilient chosen-ciphertext security in the standard model.
KW - Chosen-ciphertext security
KW - Hash proof system
KW - Leakage attack
KW - Public key encryption
KW - Tampering attack
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85067242402&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-21568-2_24
DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-21568-2_24
M3 - Conference article published in proceeding or book
AN - SCOPUS:85067242402
SN - 9783030215675
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 486
EP - 506
BT - Applied Cryptography and Network Security - 17th International Conference, ACNS 2019, Proceedings
A2 - Gauthier-Umaña, Valérie
A2 - Deng, Robert H.
A2 - Yung, Moti
A2 - Ochoa, Martín
PB - Springer Verlag
T2 - 17th International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security, ACNS 2019
Y2 - 5 June 2019 through 7 June 2019
ER -