STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND CONTRACTUAL R&D

Hamid Beladi, Sugata Marjit, Xinpeng Xu, Lei Yang

Research output: Journal article publicationJournal articleAcademic researchpeer-review

Abstract

We find that strong IPRs provide incentives for firms, both multinational and local, to specialize in R&D activities in which they have competitive advantage (the specialization effect). They also facilitate the switching process from imitators to potential innovators for local firms (the switching effect). Moreover, we also demonstrate that a multinational firm's strategic IPRs enforcement behavior can be an effective instrument for subsidizing contractual R&D in developing countries (the subsidizing effect). We further illustrate how a policy mix of IPRs and a foreign direct investment subsidy in these countries affects R&D activities by adding an offshore R&D subsidiary as an additional organizational form. (JEL L13, O31, O34).
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1904-1917
Number of pages14
JournalEconomic Inquiry
Volume54
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Oct 2016

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Economics and Econometrics

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