Strategic capacity competition and overcapacity in shipping

Ying Kou, Meifeng Luo

Research output: Journal article publicationJournal articleAcademic researchpeer-review

20 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A game theory model is developed to study the overcapacity in shipping from ocean carriers’ strategic behavior with regard to capacity expansion in a competitive market. Capacity expansion is found to be a rational decision in both peak and trough shipping markets. The benefit of expansion is greater when the competitor also expands, but this in turn leads to chronic oversupply and Prisoner’s Dilemma. A numerical simulation is then applied to confirm the analytical results. This research explains the persistent low freight rate in shipping, and points out possible strategies for stakeholders in the shipping industry to maintain a healthy global logistics system in maritime transportation.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)389-406
Number of pages18
JournalMaritime Policy and Management
Volume43
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 18 May 2016

Keywords

  • capacity competition
  • modeling
  • Normal form game
  • over-supply
  • Prisoner’s Dilemma

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Geography, Planning and Development
  • Transportation
  • Ocean Engineering
  • Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law

Cite this