Abstract
Purpose: This paper aims to examine the behavior of “rational” residential developers, under game theory, for their pricing strategy in a competitive environment. Design/methodology/approach: Results show that residential developers cooperate implicitly for long-term benefit, leading to a slow-down in sales. Developers are motivated to deviate from cooperating at the beginning and at the end of successive periods in a sub-market. Relatively high profits, earnable in the first few periods, provide an allowance to undercut prices and improve sales. For the last few periods, the punishment for any deviation from cooperating is insignificant or zero. Note that the first-mover advantage in a new market is evident. On the effect of uncertainty on the developer’s residential prices, results show that as uncertainty increases, prices decrease while price variability increases. Research limitations/implications: This study highlights the merits of a uniquely simplified experimental research design for the strategic behavioral pricing of the private residential development market using a game theoretic approach. Practical implications: This study enhances the understanding of the residential development strategy of developers in the residential development market. Originality/value: There is limited research on pricing strategy for the private residential development market in Asia.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 526-557 |
Number of pages | 32 |
Journal | International Journal of Housing Markets and Analysis |
Volume | 12 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 5 Aug 2019 |
Keywords
- Behavioral pricing
- Behavioural pricing
- Development and redevelopment
- Equilibrium price
- Experimental research design
- First-mover advantage
- First-mover advantage and price uncertainty
- Game theoretic approach
- Investor-developer
- Price uncertainty
- Pricing strategies
- Private residential development market
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)