Stackelberg game analysis of government subsidy on sustainable off-site construction and low-carbon logistics

Wen Yi, Lu Zhen, Yong Jin

Research output: Journal article publicationJournal articleAcademic researchpeer-review

29 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper considers promoting off-site construction using government subsidy. A three-stage Stackelberg game model is formulated for the optimal subsidy design for the government, accounting for the decisions of government, suppliers (owners of off-site construction yards), and customers (entities that buy precast concrete from the suppliers). The government has two objectives: one is to maximize the use of precast concrete produced by regional yards and the other is to reduce green-house gas emissions from the transport of precast concrete. A number of properties of the three-stage Stackelberg game framework have been analyzed. We find that an inappropriately designed subsidy scheme may decrease the use of precast concrete produced by regional yards and increase green-house gas emissions from the transport of precast concrete, compared with a no-subsidy benchmark.

Original languageEnglish
Article number100013
JournalCleaner Logistics and Supply Chain
Volume2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2021

Keywords

  • Off-site construction
  • Subsidy model
  • Sustainable construction logistics
  • Three-stage Stackelberg game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Management of Technology and Innovation
  • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
  • Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law
  • Environmental Science (miscellaneous)

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Stackelberg game analysis of government subsidy on sustainable off-site construction and low-carbon logistics'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this