TY - JOUR
T1 - Stackelberg game analysis of government subsidy on sustainable off-site construction and low-carbon logistics
AU - Yi, Wen
AU - Zhen, Lu
AU - Jin, Yong
N1 - Funding Information:
The work described in this paper was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant numbers 72025103 , 71831008 , 72071173 ) and partially supported by the funding for Projects of Strategic Importance of The Hong Kong Polytechnic University (Project Code : 1-ZE2D ).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 The Authors
PY - 2021/12
Y1 - 2021/12
N2 - This paper considers promoting off-site construction using government subsidy. A three-stage Stackelberg game model is formulated for the optimal subsidy design for the government, accounting for the decisions of government, suppliers (owners of off-site construction yards), and customers (entities that buy precast concrete from the suppliers). The government has two objectives: one is to maximize the use of precast concrete produced by regional yards and the other is to reduce green-house gas emissions from the transport of precast concrete. A number of properties of the three-stage Stackelberg game framework have been analyzed. We find that an inappropriately designed subsidy scheme may decrease the use of precast concrete produced by regional yards and increase green-house gas emissions from the transport of precast concrete, compared with a no-subsidy benchmark.
AB - This paper considers promoting off-site construction using government subsidy. A three-stage Stackelberg game model is formulated for the optimal subsidy design for the government, accounting for the decisions of government, suppliers (owners of off-site construction yards), and customers (entities that buy precast concrete from the suppliers). The government has two objectives: one is to maximize the use of precast concrete produced by regional yards and the other is to reduce green-house gas emissions from the transport of precast concrete. A number of properties of the three-stage Stackelberg game framework have been analyzed. We find that an inappropriately designed subsidy scheme may decrease the use of precast concrete produced by regional yards and increase green-house gas emissions from the transport of precast concrete, compared with a no-subsidy benchmark.
KW - Off-site construction
KW - Subsidy model
KW - Sustainable construction logistics
KW - Three-stage Stackelberg game
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85126946267&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.clscn.2021.100013
DO - 10.1016/j.clscn.2021.100013
M3 - Journal article
AN - SCOPUS:85126946267
SN - 2772-3909
VL - 2
JO - Cleaner Logistics and Supply Chain
JF - Cleaner Logistics and Supply Chain
M1 - 100013
ER -
