Spoofing mitigation based on Doppler frequency and pseudorange corrections in GNSS receiver

Jingxiaotao Fang, Bing Xu

Research output: Chapter in book / Conference proceedingConference article published in proceeding or bookAcademic researchpeer-review

Abstract

The reliability and security of the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) have become critical concerns in recent years. Synchronous spoofing attacks, in particular, can deceive users by providing false position, velocity, and time (PVT) solutions without causing significant power increases or disrupting the receiver's tracking loop. Consequently, mitigating these sophisticated spoofing attacks in low-cost standalone receivers remains a significant challenge. To address this, Doppler-based spoofing mitigation methods have been proposed, leveraging the receiver's Doppler measurement features to estimate the parameters of incoming signals. Theoretical analysis characterizes Doppler measurements under interference, and the effectiveness of the proposed method is validated using widely used opensource data with spoofing attacks.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2025 IEEE/ION Position, Location and Navigation Symposium, PLANS 2025 (28 Apr-1 May 2025)
Pages306-315
Number of pages10
ISBN (Electronic)9798331523176
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2025
Event2025 IEEE/ION Position, Location and Navigation Symposium, PLANS 2025 - Salt Lake City, United States
Duration: 28 Apr 20251 May 2025

Conference

Conference2025 IEEE/ION Position, Location and Navigation Symposium, PLANS 2025
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CitySalt Lake City
Period28/04/251/05/25

Keywords

  • Doppler frequency
  • GNSS receiver
  • spoofing mitigation
  • tracking loop

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Aerospace Engineering
  • Automotive Engineering
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Electronic, Optical and Magnetic Materials
  • Instrumentation
  • Control and Optimization

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