TY - JOUR
T1 - Simulation-based selective opening security for receivers under chosen-ciphertext attacks
AU - Huang, Zhengan
AU - Lai, Junzuo
AU - Chen, Wenbin
AU - Au, Man Ho
AU - Peng, Zhen
AU - Li, Jin
N1 - Funding Information:
Acknowledgements Zhengan Huang was supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 61702125), and Scientific Research Foundation for Post-doctoral Researchers of Guangzhou (No. gdbsh2016020). Junzuo Lai was supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 61572235), Guangdong Natural Science Funds for Distinguished Young Scholar (No. 2015A030306045), and Pearl River S&T Nova Program of Guangzhou. Wenbin Chen was partly supported by the Program for Innovative Research Team in Education Department of Guangdong Province Under Grant No.2015KCXTD014. and No.2016KCXTD017. Jin Li was supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 61472091), National Natural Science Foundation for Outstanding Youth Foundation (No. 61722203), and the State Key Laboratory of Cryptology, Beijing, China.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2018, Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature.
PY - 2019/6/15
Y1 - 2019/6/15
N2 - Security against selective opening attack (SOA) for receivers requires that in a multi-user setting, even if an adversary has access to all ciphertexts, and adaptively corrupts some fraction of the users to obtain the decryption keys corresponding to some of the ciphertexts, the remaining (potentially related) ciphertexts retain their privacy. In this paper, we study simulation-based selective opening security for receivers of public key encryption (PKE) schemes under chosen-ciphertext attacks (RSIM-SO-CCA). Concretely, we first show that some known PKE schemes meet RSIM-SO-CCA security. Then, we introduce the notion of master-key SOA security for identity-based encryption (IBE), and extend the Canetti–Halevi–Katz transformation to show generic PKE constructions achieving RSIM-SO-CCA security. Finally, we show how to construct an IBE scheme achieving master-key SOA security.
AB - Security against selective opening attack (SOA) for receivers requires that in a multi-user setting, even if an adversary has access to all ciphertexts, and adaptively corrupts some fraction of the users to obtain the decryption keys corresponding to some of the ciphertexts, the remaining (potentially related) ciphertexts retain their privacy. In this paper, we study simulation-based selective opening security for receivers of public key encryption (PKE) schemes under chosen-ciphertext attacks (RSIM-SO-CCA). Concretely, we first show that some known PKE schemes meet RSIM-SO-CCA security. Then, we introduce the notion of master-key SOA security for identity-based encryption (IBE), and extend the Canetti–Halevi–Katz transformation to show generic PKE constructions achieving RSIM-SO-CCA security. Finally, we show how to construct an IBE scheme achieving master-key SOA security.
KW - Chosen-ciphertext attacks
KW - Identity-based encryption
KW - Public-key encryption
KW - Selective opening security for receivers
KW - Simulation-based security
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85051674902&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s10623-018-0530-1
DO - 10.1007/s10623-018-0530-1
M3 - Journal article
AN - SCOPUS:85051674902
SN - 0925-1022
VL - 87
SP - 1345
EP - 1371
JO - Designs, Codes, and Cryptography
JF - Designs, Codes, and Cryptography
IS - 6
ER -