Secure and Efficient Certificateless Homomorphic Signature Scheme for Network Coding

Network coding, as a routing technology to improve network throughput and robustness, is widely used in various scenarios. However, network coding is vulnerable to pollution attacks where nodes may maliciously modify transmitted data packets. Recently, certificateless linearly homomorphic signature schemes have been proposed to resist pollution attacks in network coding, which avoids burdensome certificate management and the key-escrow issue. In this paper, we show that Wu et al.’s certificateless homomorphic network coding signature (CHNCS) scheme, Chang et al.’s CHNCS scheme, and Li et al.’s CHNCS are not secure against pollution attacks in network coding. Then we present a secure and efficient CHNCS scheme and prove it is unforgeable against adaptive chosen identity-and-subspace attacks under two types of adversaries. Finally, performance analysis illustrates that our scheme is more efficient in practical application.