Rivalry between airport ancillary and city-center supplies

Achim I. Czerny; Hanxiang Zhang

doi:10.1016/j.tre.2020.101987

Rivalry between airport ancillary and city-center supplies

Achim I. Czerny, Hanxiang Zhang

Research output: Journal article publication › Journal article › Academic research › peer-review

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Passengers can buy souvenirs or rent a car at the airport or in the city-center. This paper develops a basic model with unit demands for airport ancillary and city-center demands to derive equilibrium pricing strategies of profit-maximizing airports and city-center companies and evaluates them from the social viewpoint. Passengers are myopic in the sense that only ticket prices matter for flight decisions or foresighted in the sense that non-aeronautical airport and city-center supplies matter for flight decisions, too. We find that the welfare evaluation of equilibrium airport pricing behavior can be independent of whether passengers are myopic or foresighted.

Original language	English
Article number	101987
Journal	Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review
Volume	141
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tre.2020.101987
Publication status	Published - Sept 2020

Keywords

Airport privatization
Ancillary goods
City-center rivalry
Foresighted passengers
Myopic passengers

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Business and International Management
Civil and Structural Engineering
Transportation

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

More information

10.1016/j.tre.2020.101987

http://hdl.handle.net/10397/89870

Cite this

@article{c40d8dbc7f5f483cbd6c1f56cb1c26b3,

title = "Rivalry between airport ancillary and city-center supplies",

abstract = "Passengers can buy souvenirs or rent a car at the airport or in the city-center. This paper develops a basic model with unit demands for airport ancillary and city-center demands to derive equilibrium pricing strategies of profit-maximizing airports and city-center companies and evaluates them from the social viewpoint. Passengers are myopic in the sense that only ticket prices matter for flight decisions or foresighted in the sense that non-aeronautical airport and city-center supplies matter for flight decisions, too. We find that the welfare evaluation of equilibrium airport pricing behavior can be independent of whether passengers are myopic or foresighted.",

keywords = "Airport privatization, Ancillary goods, City-center rivalry, Foresighted passengers, Myopic passengers",

author = "Czerny, {Achim I.} and Hanxiang Zhang",

year = "2020",

month = sep,

doi = "10.1016/j.tre.2020.101987",

language = "English",

volume = "141",

journal = "Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review",

issn = "1366-5545",

publisher = "Elsevier Ltd",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Rivalry between airport ancillary and city-center supplies

AU - Czerny, Achim I.

AU - Zhang, Hanxiang

PY - 2020/9

Y1 - 2020/9

N2 - Passengers can buy souvenirs or rent a car at the airport or in the city-center. This paper develops a basic model with unit demands for airport ancillary and city-center demands to derive equilibrium pricing strategies of profit-maximizing airports and city-center companies and evaluates them from the social viewpoint. Passengers are myopic in the sense that only ticket prices matter for flight decisions or foresighted in the sense that non-aeronautical airport and city-center supplies matter for flight decisions, too. We find that the welfare evaluation of equilibrium airport pricing behavior can be independent of whether passengers are myopic or foresighted.

AB - Passengers can buy souvenirs or rent a car at the airport or in the city-center. This paper develops a basic model with unit demands for airport ancillary and city-center demands to derive equilibrium pricing strategies of profit-maximizing airports and city-center companies and evaluates them from the social viewpoint. Passengers are myopic in the sense that only ticket prices matter for flight decisions or foresighted in the sense that non-aeronautical airport and city-center supplies matter for flight decisions, too. We find that the welfare evaluation of equilibrium airport pricing behavior can be independent of whether passengers are myopic or foresighted.

KW - Airport privatization

KW - Ancillary goods

KW - City-center rivalry

KW - Foresighted passengers

KW - Myopic passengers

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85087505114&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.tre.2020.101987

DO - 10.1016/j.tre.2020.101987

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85087505114

SN - 1366-5545

VL - 141

JO - Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review

JF - Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review

M1 - 101987

ER -

Rivalry between airport ancillary and city-center supplies

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

UN SDGs

More information

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this