Risk analysis of volume cheat strategy in a competitive capacity market

Donghan Feng, Zhao Xu

Research output: Chapter in book / Conference proceedingConference article published in proceeding or bookAcademic researchpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)


Capacity market provides additional revenue stream for the power suppliers. In a capacity-energy combined market environment, suppliers have incentives to deliberately over-offer their capacities in the capacity market while bid very high price in the energy and ancillary markets to avoid operation. This paper analyzes the risks and profits of this capacity-over-offer behavior, and develops a method for computing non-operable penalty level which can prevent the capacity-over-offer behavior. It is found that the effective penalty level is highly correlated with the stochastic characteristics of the supplier's profit streams and attitudes towards risk. Two types of suppliers are identified with high potential of capacity cheating behavior in the analysis. The methodology and the results are potentially useful for regulating participants' misbehaviors and enhancing the operation security in a capacity-energy market environment.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2009 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PES '09
Publication statusPublished - 1 Dec 2009
Externally publishedYes
Event2009 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PES '09 - Calgary, AB, Canada
Duration: 26 Jul 200930 Jul 2009


Conference2009 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PES '09
CityCalgary, AB


  • Capacity market
  • Monte-Carlo simulation
  • Prospect theory
  • Risk management
  • Volume cheat

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Energy Engineering and Power Technology
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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