TY - JOUR
T1 - Remanufacturing strategies under product take-back regulation
AU - Xu, Jie
AU - Ng, C. T.
AU - Cheng, T. C.E.
N1 - Funding Information:
This research project (Project Number: S2019.A8.013.19S) is funded by the Strategic Public Policy Research Funding Scheme from the Policy Innovation and Co-ordination Office of the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. This research is also supported by the Science and Technology Project of Jiangxi Provincial Education Department (No. GJJ200520 ), and National Natural Science Foundation of China under Research Project Grant No. 7186020150 and No. 71961009 .
Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 Elsevier B.V.
PY - 2021/5
Y1 - 2021/5
N2 - We consider a profit-maximizing original equipment manufacturer (OEM) that produces a new product for the primary market. At the end of the first stage of product use, the OEM collects the used products (cores) and remanufactures them if they are eligible for remanufacturing; otherwise, the OEM sends them to material recycling. In the US and most European countries, the product take-back regulation mandated by the government holds the OEM accountable for the proper and safe treatment of end-of-life products in order to reduce their harmful environmental effects, and sets a collection rate target. In this paper, we take the collection rate of used products as an endogenous variable satisfying the set target and consider the uncertainty of the amount of collected cores qualified for remanufacturing. We formulate the problem and derive several optimal remanufacturing strategies for the OEM, depending on the inverse operating cost and new product manufacturing cost with and without the take-back regulation. Our major findings are: (i) The OEM should adopt the maximum (minimum) collection rate when the inverse operating cost is extremely low (high). (ii) A combination of the inverse operating cost and new product manufacturing cost leads to the optimal collection rate, thereby determining the new and remanufactured product prices, and remanufacturing quantity. (iii) A comparison between the cases with and without the take-back regulation indicates that, counter-intuitively, regulating the collection rate may not necessarily hurt the OEM.
AB - We consider a profit-maximizing original equipment manufacturer (OEM) that produces a new product for the primary market. At the end of the first stage of product use, the OEM collects the used products (cores) and remanufactures them if they are eligible for remanufacturing; otherwise, the OEM sends them to material recycling. In the US and most European countries, the product take-back regulation mandated by the government holds the OEM accountable for the proper and safe treatment of end-of-life products in order to reduce their harmful environmental effects, and sets a collection rate target. In this paper, we take the collection rate of used products as an endogenous variable satisfying the set target and consider the uncertainty of the amount of collected cores qualified for remanufacturing. We formulate the problem and derive several optimal remanufacturing strategies for the OEM, depending on the inverse operating cost and new product manufacturing cost with and without the take-back regulation. Our major findings are: (i) The OEM should adopt the maximum (minimum) collection rate when the inverse operating cost is extremely low (high). (ii) A combination of the inverse operating cost and new product manufacturing cost leads to the optimal collection rate, thereby determining the new and remanufactured product prices, and remanufacturing quantity. (iii) A comparison between the cases with and without the take-back regulation indicates that, counter-intuitively, regulating the collection rate may not necessarily hurt the OEM.
KW - Cores
KW - Remanufacturing
KW - Take-back regulation
KW - Uncertainty
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85104944379&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.ijpe.2021.108091
DO - 10.1016/j.ijpe.2021.108091
M3 - Journal article
AN - SCOPUS:85104944379
SN - 0925-5273
VL - 235
JO - International Journal of Production Economics
JF - International Journal of Production Economics
M1 - 108091
ER -