Rationalizing vertical information flow in a bilateral monopoly

Li Jiang, Zhongyuan Hao

Research output: Journal article publicationJournal articleAcademic researchpeer-review

Abstract

We investigate vertical information sharing in a bilateral monopoly. The retailer orders from the supplier and sells in a market with uncertain demand. The retailer has access to a series of correlated demand signals and the supplier can offer payments to acquire signals from the retailer. We establish the sufficient condition to sustain vertical information flow, and examine the implications of information transaction procedure for system performance.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)419-424
Number of pages6
JournalOperations Research Letters
Volume44
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 May 2016

Keywords

  • Bilateral monopoly
  • Information sharing
  • Nash equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
  • Applied Mathematics

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