Rank-and-file employee stock options and audit pricing: Evidence from S&P 1500 firms

Xiaoqi Chen, Maoliang Li, Emmanuel Obiri-Yeboah, Qiang Wu

Research output: Journal article publicationJournal articleAcademic researchpeer-review

Abstract

In this study, we examine the impact of rank-and-file employee stock options on audit fees. We document compelling evidence that option grants to rank-and-file employees are positively related to audit fees. Further analyses show that this positive relation is more pronounced when a firm's real earnings manipulation risk is higher and when rank-and-file employees are more sensitive to monetary incentives. We also find that options granted to rank-and-file employees are positively related to audit efforts. The evidence suggests that auditors perceive options to rank-and-file employees to be associated with increased audit risk.

Original languageEnglish
Article number101422
JournalBritish Accounting Review
Volume56
Issue number6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2024

Keywords

  • Audit effort
  • Audit fees
  • Audit risk
  • Earnings manipulation
  • Rank-and-file employee stock options

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting

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