Abstract
In this study, we examine the impact of rank-and-file employee stock options on audit fees. We document compelling evidence that option grants to rank-and-file employees are positively related to audit fees. Further analyses show that this positive relation is more pronounced when a firm's real earnings manipulation risk is higher and when rank-and-file employees are more sensitive to monetary incentives. We also find that options granted to rank-and-file employees are positively related to audit efforts. The evidence suggests that auditors perceive options to rank-and-file employees to be associated with increased audit risk.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 101422 |
Journal | British Accounting Review |
Volume | 56 |
Issue number | 6 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Nov 2024 |
Keywords
- Audit effort
- Audit fees
- Audit risk
- Earnings manipulation
- Rank-and-file employee stock options
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Accounting