Abstract
This paper takes up the debate whether price-cap regulation of airports should take the form of single-till or dual-till regulation. The contribution is to model single- and dual-till regulation, evaluate their welfare implications, and compare them to Ramsey charges. We show that single-till regulation dominates dual-till regulation at non-congested airports with regard to welfare maximization. However, none of them provides an airport with incentives to implement Ramsey charges. A Ramsey optimal price-cap regulation, which achieves this goal, is also presented.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 85-97 |
Number of pages | 13 |
Journal | Journal of Regulatory Economics |
Volume | 30 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Jul 2006 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Airport
- Dual-till
- Price-cap regulation
- Single-till
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics