The China Telecom and China Unicom case in China has shown that the Chinese competition authorities have, in the presumptions of market dominance under Article 19 of China's Antimonopoly Law (AML), a powerful weapon to combat anticompetitive conduct in oligopolistic markets. However, little is known about these presumptions. More particularly, how these presumptions shape the legal test of market dominance for multiple firms in China has not been evident. This article addresses this question using a comparative approach. It compares Articles 19(2) and 19(3) AML with their corresponding laws in Europe, namely the law of collective dominance in Article 102 TFEU. Findings show that these two sets of rules function very differently. A powerful distinction comes from the Article 102 TFEU's requirement of collective entity, which has thus far not been pursued by the law of market dominance in China. The result is that, unlike the European Commission, the Chinese competition authorities are more able to restrict the unilateral conduct of firms operating in a non-collusive oligopoly.
|Number of pages||25|
|Publication status||Published - 2013|
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics