TY - JOUR
T1 - Parking sharing problem with spatially distributed parking supplies
AU - Zhang, Fangni
AU - Liu, Wei
AU - Wang, Xiaolei
AU - Yang, Hai
N1 - Funding Information:
We would like to thank the anonymous referees for their constructive comments, which have helped improve both the technical quality and exposition of this paper substantially. This research was partly supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 71974146), and the Australian Research Council (DE200101793), and the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong (HKUST16206317).
Funding Information:
We would like to thank the anonymous referees for their constructive comments, which have helped improve both the technical quality and exposition of this paper substantially. This research was partly supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 71974146 ), and the Australian Research Council ( DE200101793 ), and the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong ( HKUST16206317 ).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 Elsevier Ltd
PY - 2020/8
Y1 - 2020/8
N2 - This study models and manages the parking sharing problem in urban cities, where private parking owners can share their vacant spaces to parking users via a parking sharing platform. The proposed model takes into account the spatial dimension of parking, where clusters of curbside spaces and private shareable ones are distributed over different locations. On the supply side, private parking owners can “sell the right-of-use” of their spaces to the platform based on the rent they can receive and the inconvenience they would experience due to sharing. On the demand side, travelers make their parking choices of space type (curbside or shared) and location under given parking capacities and prices. The resulting parking choice equilibrium is formulated as a minimization problem and several properties of the equilibrium are identified and discussed. The platform operator's pricing strategy, i.e., rent paid to space owners and price charged on space users, can significantly affect the private parking owners’ sharing decisions and the choice equilibrium of parking users. In this context, we examine the platform operator's optimal pricing strategies for revenue-maximization or social-cost-minimization. Numerical examples are also presented to illustrate the models and results and to provide further insights.
AB - This study models and manages the parking sharing problem in urban cities, where private parking owners can share their vacant spaces to parking users via a parking sharing platform. The proposed model takes into account the spatial dimension of parking, where clusters of curbside spaces and private shareable ones are distributed over different locations. On the supply side, private parking owners can “sell the right-of-use” of their spaces to the platform based on the rent they can receive and the inconvenience they would experience due to sharing. On the demand side, travelers make their parking choices of space type (curbside or shared) and location under given parking capacities and prices. The resulting parking choice equilibrium is formulated as a minimization problem and several properties of the equilibrium are identified and discussed. The platform operator's pricing strategy, i.e., rent paid to space owners and price charged on space users, can significantly affect the private parking owners’ sharing decisions and the choice equilibrium of parking users. In this context, we examine the platform operator's optimal pricing strategies for revenue-maximization or social-cost-minimization. Numerical examples are also presented to illustrate the models and results and to provide further insights.
KW - Parking choice equilibrium
KW - Parking location
KW - Parking sharing
KW - Pricing strategy
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85087272585&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.trc.2020.102676
DO - 10.1016/j.trc.2020.102676
M3 - Journal article
AN - SCOPUS:85087272585
SN - 0968-090X
VL - 117
JO - Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies
JF - Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies
M1 - 102676
ER -