On the advantage of leadership in service pricing competition

Pengfei Guo, Refael Hassin

Research output: Journal article publicationJournal articleAcademic researchpeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider Stackelberg pricing games between two servers with homogeneous customers. We find that a first-mover advantage holds when the demand is large and that a second-mover advantage exists when the demand is scarce.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)397-402
Number of pages6
JournalOperations Research Letters
Volume41
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 28 May 2013

Keywords

  • First-mover advantage
  • Price leadership
  • Queueing
  • Service competition
  • Strategic customers

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Applied Mathematics
  • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
  • Software

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