On the advantage of leadership in service pricing competition

Pengfei Guo; Refael Hassin

doi:10.1016/j.orl.2013.04.009

On the advantage of leadership in service pricing competition

Pengfei Guo, Refael Hassin

Research output: Journal article publication › Journal article › Academic research › peer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider Stackelberg pricing games between two servers with homogeneous customers. We find that a first-mover advantage holds when the demand is large and that a second-mover advantage exists when the demand is scarce.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	397-402
Number of pages	6
Journal	Operations Research Letters
Volume	41
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2013.04.009
Publication status	Published - 28 May 2013

Keywords

First-mover advantage
Price leadership
Queueing
Service competition
Strategic customers

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Management Science and Operations Research
Applied Mathematics
Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
Software

More information

10.1016/j.orl.2013.04.009

Cite this

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abstract = "We consider Stackelberg pricing games between two servers with homogeneous customers. We find that a first-mover advantage holds when the demand is large and that a second-mover advantage exists when the demand is scarce.",

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KW - Price leadership

KW - Queueing

KW - Service competition

KW - Strategic customers

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DO - 10.1016/j.orl.2013.04.009

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JO - Operations Research Letters

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On the advantage of leadership in service pricing competition

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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