On providing wormhole-attack-resistant localization using conflicting sets

Wormhole attack is a severe attack that can be easily mounted on a wide range of wireless networks without compromising any cryptographic entity or network node. In the wormhole attack, an attacker sniffs packets at one point in the network and tunnels them through the wormhole link to another point. Such kind of attack can deteriorate the localization procedure in wireless sensor networks. In this paper, we first analyze the impacts of the wormhole attack on the localization procedure. Then, we propose a secure localization scheme against the wormhole attacks called SLAW including three phases: wormhole attack detection, neighboring locators differentiation, and secure localization. The main idea of the SLAW is to build a so-called conflicting set for each locator based on the abnormalities during the message exchanges, which can be used to differentiate the dubious locators to achieve secure localization. We first consider the simplified system model in which there is no packet loss and all the nodes have the same transmission range. We further consider the general system model where the packet loss exists and different types of nodes have different transmission radii. We conduct the simulations to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed secure localization scheme and compare it with the existing schemes under different network parameters.