On maximizing a loss-averse buyer’s expected utility in a multi-sourcing problem

Xinsheng Xu, Ping Ji, Felix T.S. Chan (Corresponding Author)

Research output: Journal article publicationJournal articleAcademic researchpeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The paper studies optimal purchasing policies for buyers in a multi-sourcing problem. For a multi-souring problem, the study first obtains the optimal purchasing policy for a loss-neutral buyer to maximize expected profit. In a multi-sourcing, we find that a loss-neutral buyer could purchase no commodities and can rely only on spot buying to meet the whole market demand if the wholesale price is larger than the spot price. Further, the research finds that a loss-neutral buyer's optimal purchasing quantity is independent of the retail price. To reveal the loss aversion effect, the study introduces the well-known loss aversion function and obtains the optimal purchasing policy to maximize a loss-averse buyer's expected utility in a multi-sourcing. To maximize expected utility, it is proven that a loss-averse buyer who becomes more loss-averse should purchase fewer items in the long-term contract. Moreover, under the optimal purchasing policy that maximizes expected utility, a loss-averse buyer's expected profit is decreasing when the loss aversion coefficient is increasing. If a loss-averse buyer intends to get a bigger expected profit, he/she should be less loss-averse and select an optimal purchasing policy with a smaller loss aversion coefficient.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)388-404
Number of pages17
JournalMathematics and Computers in Simulation
Volume202
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2022

Keywords

  • Long-term contract
  • Multi-sourcing
  • Optimal purchasing decision
  • Spot buying

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • General Computer Science
  • Numerical Analysis
  • Modelling and Simulation
  • Applied Mathematics

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'On maximizing a loss-averse buyer’s expected utility in a multi-sourcing problem'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this