Abstract
In the maritime transport industry, a terminal concession often specifies the competition conditions during the concession period. This study proposes a game model with which the effects of competition for seaport terminal awards can be studied. The modeling results suggest that (a) a terminal operator always prefers to control more terminals in the region; (b) if all terminal operators expand their operations to every port, they will be worse off due to an increase of inter- and intra-port competitions, a situation similar to the prisoners' dilemma; and (c) when a port authority has significant market power, it prefers to introduce inter- and intra-port competition, rather than allowing one operator to monopolize all terminals. (d) multiple equilibria may be observed in concession awarding depending on market characteristics associated to a particular market. Anecdotal observations consistent with these modeling results are presented and discussed.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 341-349 |
Number of pages | 9 |
Journal | Transport Policy |
Volume | 35 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 2014 |
Keywords
- Intra-port competition
- Port competition
- Port concessions
- Seaports terminal awarding
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Geography, Planning and Development
- Transportation
- Law