Model of Equipment Sharing between Contractors on Construction Projects

Zhi Liu, Hongwei Wang, Heng Li

Research output: Journal article publicationJournal articleAcademic researchpeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Because of significant characteristics such as complexity and uncertainty, the construction schedules of large-scale projects are often postponed as a result of a shortage of important equipment. By sharing its own incentive reward with other contractors for acquiring extra equipment, a contractor with a lack of equipment resources can reduce time delays and even complete projects in advance. This paper focuses on analyzing onsite construction equipment sharing among contractors from different sections of the same project. First, two forms of time incentives are applied to encourage the contractors to decrease their construction duration by sharing equipment resources. Then, based on an analysis of the influence that equipment sharing has on construction duration, a Stackelberg model among the equipment-sharing contractors is developed to build the contractors' gain functions and simulate the equipment-sharing process. Finally, a numerical analysis is conducted to analyze the effect that a time incentive and construction costs have on the contractors' benefits. The results demonstrate that the incentive for a contractor needing more equipment is positively associated with the gains of both contractors, whereas the incentive for the contractor lending out equipment acts inversely. This paper contributes to the body of knowledge for understanding the process of onsite equipment sharing among contractors. By capturing the contractors' aspect of equipment sharing, this study provides a practical model to aid the client in settling resource-leveling problems rather than using traditional approaches that have been conducted from the client's perspective. This research should be beneficial for project managers to better understand how suitable incentive contracts can facilitate equipment sharing among contractors and consequently help ensure construction schedule.
Original languageEnglish
Article number04018039
JournalJournal of Construction Engineering and Management
Volume144
Issue number6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2018

Keywords

  • Contractors partnering
  • Equipment sharing
  • Incentive contracting
  • Schedule and cost
  • Stackelberg game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Civil and Structural Engineering
  • Building and Construction
  • Industrial relations
  • Strategy and Management

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