Mechanism Design for Facility Location Problem: A Survey

Hau Chan, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Bo Li, Minming Li, Chenhao Wang

Research output: Chapter in book / Conference proceedingConference article published in proceeding or bookAcademic researchpeer-review

Abstract

The study of approximate mechanism design for facility location problems has been in the center of research at the intersection of artificial intelligence and economics for the last decades, largely due to its practical importance in various domains, such as social planning and clustering.
At a high level, the goal is to design mechanisms to select a set of locations on which to build a set of facilities, aiming to optimize some social objective and ensure desirable properties based on the preferences of strategic agents, who might have incentives to misreport their private information such as their locations. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of the significant progress that has been made since the introduction of the problem, highlighting the different variants and methodologies, as well as the most interesting directions for future research.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe 30th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2021)
Pages1-17
Number of pages17
Publication statusPublished - 2021

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