TY - GEN
T1 - Maximal Information Propagation via Lotteries
AU - Chen, Jing
AU - Li, Bo
N1 - Funding Information:
The authors thank Costantinos Daskalakis, Yossi Gilad, Victor Luchangco, and Silvio Micali for helpful discussions in the early stage of this work, and several anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. Part of this work was done when Bo Li was an intern at Algorand. Bo Li is partially supported by the Hong Kong Polytechnic University (No. P0034420).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2022, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
PY - 2021/10
Y1 - 2021/10
N2 - Propagating information to more people through their friends is becoming an increasingly important technology used in domains such as blockchain, advertising, and social media. To incentivize people to broadcast the information, the designer may use a monetary rewarding scheme, which specifies who gets how much, to compensate for the propagation. Several properties are desirable for the rewarding scheme, such as budget feasible, individually rational, incentive compatible and Sybil-proof. In this work, we design a free market with lotteries, where every participant can decide by herself how much of the reward she wants to withhold before propagating to others. We show that in the free market, the participants have a strong incentive to maximally propagate the information and all the above properties are satisfied automatically.
AB - Propagating information to more people through their friends is becoming an increasingly important technology used in domains such as blockchain, advertising, and social media. To incentivize people to broadcast the information, the designer may use a monetary rewarding scheme, which specifies who gets how much, to compensate for the propagation. Several properties are desirable for the rewarding scheme, such as budget feasible, individually rational, incentive compatible and Sybil-proof. In this work, we design a free market with lotteries, where every participant can decide by herself how much of the reward she wants to withhold before propagating to others. We show that in the free market, the participants have a strong incentive to maximally propagate the information and all the above properties are satisfied automatically.
KW - Free market design
KW - Information propagation
KW - Nash equilibrium
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85124323226&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_27
DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_27
M3 - Conference article published in proceeding or book
AN - SCOPUS:85124323226
SN - 9783030946753
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 486
EP - 503
BT - Web and Internet Economics - 17th International Conference, WINE 2021, Proceedings
A2 - Feldman, Michal
A2 - Fu, Hu
A2 - Talgam-Cohen, Inbal
PB - Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
T2 - 17th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2021
Y2 - 14 December 2021 through 17 December 2021
ER -