Abstract
We study a two-period intertemporal pricing game in a single-server service system with forward-looking strategic customers who make their purchase decision based on current information and anticipated future gains. Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) prices are derived. A comparison between revenue-maximizing equilibrium prices and welfare-maximizing equilibrium prices is conducted and the impact on the system's performance of misunderstanding customers' type is evaluated.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 420-424 |
| Number of pages | 5 |
| Journal | Operations Research Letters |
| Volume | 37 |
| Issue number | 6 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Nov 2009 |
Keywords
- Intertemporal pricing
- Service management
- Strategic customers
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Software
- Management Science and Operations Research
- Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
- Applied Mathematics
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