Incentive Contracts on Tourism Service Quality under Asymmetric Information

Fang Lu, George Q. Huang, Wenju Niu, Jiangshun Zhang

Research output: Journal article publicationJournal articleAcademic researchpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

This research considers incentive contracts between tour guides and travel agencies. Tour guides play an important role in achieving the overall service quality of the tourism industry. The service quality of tour guides can be improved by service efforts and service abilities that are asymmetric information for the travel agency. Two types of incentive contracts are commonly used by the travel agency to motivate tour guides to improve their service quality. One is a pooling contract with only differentiated service efforts, the other is a menu contract with both differentiated service efforts and service abilities. The results of analysis and simulation show that the menu contract dominates the pooling contract. Menu contracts can not only screen the service abilities of tour guides, but also motivate tour guides to improve service efforts. Moreover, menu contracts improve the utilities of the travel agency, and strengthen the relation between the travel agency and tour guides, leading to overall enhanced service quality of the tourism industry.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)402-423
Number of pages22
JournalJournal of China Tourism Research
Volume11
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2 Oct 2015
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • asymmetric information
  • incentive contract
  • service ability
  • service effort
  • Service quality

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Cultural Studies
  • Language and Linguistics
  • Linguistics and Language
  • Tourism, Leisure and Hospitality Management

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