TY - GEN
T1 - Improving the Efficiency of Blockchain Applications with Smart Contract based Cyber-insurance
AU - Xu, Jia
AU - Wu, Yongqi
AU - Luo, Xiapu
AU - Yang, Dejun
N1 - Funding Information:
This work has been supported in part by the NSFC (No. 61872193), NSF (No. 1717315), and STITP of NJUPT (No. SYB2018019).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 IEEE.
PY - 2020/6
Y1 - 2020/6
N2 - Blockchain based applications benefit from decentralization, data privacy, and anonymity. However, they may suffer from inefficiency due to underlying blockchain. In this paper, we aim to address this limitation while still enjoying the privacy and anonymity. Taking the blockchain based crowdsourcing system as an example, we propose a new smart contract based cyber-insurance framework, which can greatly shorten the delay, and enable the workers to obtain the economic compensation for increased security risk caused by a conflict between the need to provide service quickly and delay in payment. We model the process of determining insurance premium and number of confirmations as a Stackelberg Game and prove the existence of Stackelberg Equilibria, at which the utility of the requester is maximized, and none of the workers can improve its utility by unilaterally deviating from its current strategy. The experimental results show that our framework can definitely improve the time efficiency of crowdsourcing. Particularly, it takes on average only 33% of the time required by the naive blockchain based crowdsouring solution for time-sensitive cases.
AB - Blockchain based applications benefit from decentralization, data privacy, and anonymity. However, they may suffer from inefficiency due to underlying blockchain. In this paper, we aim to address this limitation while still enjoying the privacy and anonymity. Taking the blockchain based crowdsourcing system as an example, we propose a new smart contract based cyber-insurance framework, which can greatly shorten the delay, and enable the workers to obtain the economic compensation for increased security risk caused by a conflict between the need to provide service quickly and delay in payment. We model the process of determining insurance premium and number of confirmations as a Stackelberg Game and prove the existence of Stackelberg Equilibria, at which the utility of the requester is maximized, and none of the workers can improve its utility by unilaterally deviating from its current strategy. The experimental results show that our framework can definitely improve the time efficiency of crowdsourcing. Particularly, it takes on average only 33% of the time required by the naive blockchain based crowdsouring solution for time-sensitive cases.
KW - blockchain
KW - cyber-insurance
KW - game theory
KW - smart contract
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85089410110&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/ICC40277.2020.9149301
DO - 10.1109/ICC40277.2020.9149301
M3 - Conference article published in proceeding or book
AN - SCOPUS:85089410110
T3 - IEEE International Conference on Communications
SP - 1
EP - 7
BT - 2020 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2020 - Proceedings
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 2020 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2020
Y2 - 7 June 2020 through 11 June 2020
ER -