How to promote Chinese food waste-to-energy program? An evolutionary game approach

The increasing commercial value of food waste, as well as emerging opportunistic behaviours, make it difficult for the charging policy to perform as expected, consequently affecting the economic and environmental effectiveness of food waste-to-energy (WTE) program. A natural question is how to achieve the dual outcomes of reducing waste generation and attaining efficient energy utilisation within the above circumstances. This study considers the operational characteristics of food waste generators (FWGs) and food WTE firms in China, with an evolutionary game model constructed to analysis their interactive behaviours and strategic preferences. The results suggest that lowering the gate fee and increasing the punishment cost while setting a recovery cap could prevent the originally eco-friendly WTE program from being more wasteful, which is conducive to reducing waste generation and enhance energy utilisation simultaneously. There exists Liebig's law, i.e., by increasing the level of constraint (Average revenue of food waste recovered or punishment cost) could shift other evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) towards the ideal ESS. We also provide scientific and feasible approaches for government to undertake and improve its charging policy. Our findings guide countries suffering from waste disposal and energy shortage on effective and efficient food waste management.