Abstract
Aservice plan is a type of optional warranty beyond manufacturers' base warranties that retailers offer to consumers. In this paper, we examine how a service plan affects the role played by a manufacturer's base warranty. Analysis shows that when consumers can assess product quality (i.e., the probability of product failure), the manufacturer's warranty is negatively affected by the presence of a service plan. In the presence of such a plan, a base warranty is offered only when the manufacturer is very cost-efficient in providing a warranty relative to the retailer. In this case, although the double-marginalization problem is aggravated, offering a (limited) base warranty reduces the total warranty cost in the channel and provokes the retailer into enlarging the service plan coverage. When consumers cannot assess product quality, a high-quality manufacturer is motivated to offer a base warranty to signal its quality. In the presence of a service plan, however, a very cost-efficient manufacturer is discouraged from doing so.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 727-740 |
Number of pages | 14 |
Journal | Management Science |
Volume | 57 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Apr 2011 |
Keywords
- Distribution channels
- Game theory
- Service plans
- Signaling
- Warranty
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Strategy and Management
- Management Science and Operations Research