Honesty, deception, or collusion? Quality information disclosure in live streaming commerce

This study employs a Stackelberg game-theoretic framework to analyze three scenarios of product quality disclosure: honest disclosure of product quality to both consumers and influencers; deceptive disclosure of the actual quality to both influencers and consumers by brand manufacturers; and collusion between brand manufacturers and influencers in misleading consumers about the true quality. By modeling these scenarios using a multistage decision-making game, equilibrium solutions for price, promotional effort, and penalties are derived. The findings indicate that low-quality brand manufacturers encounter both “honesty” and “collusion” situations when marketing through single channels, whether self-operated or via micro influencers. Mega influencers in hybrid channels can generate positive spillover effects that benefit self-operated live streams more than low-quality ones. When the power structure shifts, the operational strategy of truthfully disclosing product quality to consumers manifests a more distinct long-term stability advantage. This study makes a significant contribution to the selection of market channels under conditions of information asymmetry, while also exploring strategies to enhance spillover effects through the adoption of hybrid channels.