Government protection, political connection and management turnover in China

Tsz Wan Cheng; T. Y. Leung

doi:10.1016/j.iref.2016.03.010

Government protection, political connection and management turnover in China

Tsz Wan Cheng, T. Y. Leung

Research output: Journal article publication › Journal article › Academic research › peer-review

37 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Mainland Chinese government employs two related strategies to protect its national and economic interests in the process of financial liberalization. It grants government protection to industries of national interest. In addition, it also maintains political-linkage with certain firms to assert their influence. We term these firms as strategic firms. We argue these strategic firms with economic and national interests demonstrate better performance and higher management turnovers. Management turnovers are less frequent if the chairpersons and CEOs are politically-connected. The strategic firms also rebound better from financial distress than non-strategic firms.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	160-176
Number of pages	17
Journal	International Review of Economics and Finance
Volume	45
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2016.03.010
Publication status	Published - 1 Sept 2016

Keywords

Government protection
Management turnover
Political connection
Strategic firm

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

More information

10.1016/j.iref.2016.03.010

Cite this

@article{1d72f7b638134dbdb3909c8d5d99a240,

title = "Government protection, political connection and management turnover in China",

abstract = "Mainland Chinese government employs two related strategies to protect its national and economic interests in the process of financial liberalization. It grants government protection to industries of national interest. In addition, it also maintains political-linkage with certain firms to assert their influence. We term these firms as strategic firms. We argue these strategic firms with economic and national interests demonstrate better performance and higher management turnovers. Management turnovers are less frequent if the chairpersons and CEOs are politically-connected. The strategic firms also rebound better from financial distress than non-strategic firms.",

keywords = "Government protection, Management turnover, Political connection, Strategic firm",

author = "Cheng, {Tsz Wan} and Leung, {T. Y.}",

year = "2016",

month = sep,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1016/j.iref.2016.03.010",

language = "English",

volume = "45",

pages = "160--176",

journal = "International Review of Economics and Finance",

issn = "1059-0560",

publisher = "Elsevier Inc.",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Government protection, political connection and management turnover in China

AU - Cheng, Tsz Wan

AU - Leung, T. Y.

PY - 2016/9/1

Y1 - 2016/9/1

N2 - Mainland Chinese government employs two related strategies to protect its national and economic interests in the process of financial liberalization. It grants government protection to industries of national interest. In addition, it also maintains political-linkage with certain firms to assert their influence. We term these firms as strategic firms. We argue these strategic firms with economic and national interests demonstrate better performance and higher management turnovers. Management turnovers are less frequent if the chairpersons and CEOs are politically-connected. The strategic firms also rebound better from financial distress than non-strategic firms.

AB - Mainland Chinese government employs two related strategies to protect its national and economic interests in the process of financial liberalization. It grants government protection to industries of national interest. In addition, it also maintains political-linkage with certain firms to assert their influence. We term these firms as strategic firms. We argue these strategic firms with economic and national interests demonstrate better performance and higher management turnovers. Management turnovers are less frequent if the chairpersons and CEOs are politically-connected. The strategic firms also rebound better from financial distress than non-strategic firms.

KW - Government protection

KW - Management turnover

KW - Political connection

KW - Strategic firm

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84973327134&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.iref.2016.03.010

DO - 10.1016/j.iref.2016.03.010

M3 - Journal article

SN - 1059-0560

VL - 45

SP - 160

EP - 176

JO - International Review of Economics and Finance

JF - International Review of Economics and Finance

ER -

Government protection, political connection and management turnover in China

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

More information

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this