Evolutionary game analysis and regulatory strategies for online group-buying based on system dynamics

Zhong Zhong Jiang, Na He, Xuwei Qin, W. H. Ip, C. H. Wu, Kai Leung Yung

Research output: Journal article publicationJournal articleAcademic researchpeer-review

22 Citations (Scopus)


The emergence of online group-buying provides a new consumption pattern for consumers in e-commerce era. However, many consumers realize that their own interests sometimes can’t be guaranteed in the group-buying market due to the lack of being regulated. This paper aims to develop effective regulation strategies for online group-buying market. To the best of our knowledge, most existing studies assume that three parties in online group-buying market, i.e. the retailer, the group-buying platform and the consumer, are perfectly rational. To better understand the decision process, in this paper, we incorporate the concept of bounded rationality into consideration. Firstly, a three-parties evolutionary game model is established to study each player’s game strategy based on bounded rationality. Secondly, the game model is simulated as a whole by adopting system dynamics to analyze its stability. Finally, theoretical analysis and extensive computational experiments are conducted to obtain the managerial insights and regulation strategies for online group-buying market. Our results clearly demonstrate that a suitable bonus-penalty measure can promote the healthy development of online group-buying market.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)695-713
Number of pages19
JournalEnterprise Information Systems
Issue number6
Publication statusPublished - 3 Jul 2018


  • bounded rationality
  • Online group-buying
  • regulatory strategies
  • system dynamics
  • three-parties evolutionary game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science Applications
  • Information Systems and Management


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