Equilibrium analysis of unobservable M∕M∕n priority queues with balking and homogeneous customers

Qingying Li; Pengfei Guo; Yulan Wang

doi:10.1016/j.orl.2020.07.012

Equilibrium analysis of unobservable M∕M∕n priority queues with balking and homogeneous customers

Qingying Li
, Pengfei Guo
, Yulan Wang

Research output: Journal article publication › Journal article › Academic research › peer-review

17 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We investigate equilibrium queueing strategies in an unobservable M∕M∕n non-preemptive priority queue with homogeneous customers. Arriving customers make decisions by choosing one of the three options: balking, joining the regular queue, or joining the priority queue with an additional fee. We adopt a sequential approach to analyze this two-dimensional queueing game. We first obtain the equilibrium choice between joining the priority or the regular queue given a fixed total joining rate, and then we determine the equilibrium total joining rate.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	674-681
Number of pages	8
Journal	Operations Research Letters
Volume	48
Issue number	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2020.07.012
Publication status	Published - Sept 2020

Keywords

Equilibrium analysis
Priority queue
Strategic queueing
Unobservable queue

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Software
Management Science and Operations Research
Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
Applied Mathematics

More information

10.1016/j.orl.2020.07.012

http://hdl.handle.net/10397/89869

Cite this

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title = "Equilibrium analysis of unobservable M∕M∕n priority queues with balking and homogeneous customers",

abstract = "We investigate equilibrium queueing strategies in an unobservable M∕M∕n non-preemptive priority queue with homogeneous customers. Arriving customers make decisions by choosing one of the three options: balking, joining the regular queue, or joining the priority queue with an additional fee. We adopt a sequential approach to analyze this two-dimensional queueing game. We first obtain the equilibrium choice between joining the priority or the regular queue given a fixed total joining rate, and then we determine the equilibrium total joining rate.",

keywords = "Equilibrium analysis, Priority queue, Strategic queueing, Unobservable queue",

author = "Qingying Li and Pengfei Guo and Yulan Wang",

note = "Funding Information: The first author Qingying Li was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under the grant no. 71871052 , 71832001 , the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities, China , and DHU Distinguished Young Professor Program, China . The second author Pengfei Guo was supported in part by the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong under grant no. 15506417 . The third author Yulan Wang acknowledges the financial supports from the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong (RGC Reference Number: 15505318 ). Funding Information: The first author Qingying Li was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under the grant no. 71871052, 71832001, the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities, China, and DHU Distinguished Young Professor Program, China. The second author Pengfei Guo was supported in part by the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong under grant no. 15506417. The third author Yulan Wang acknowledges the financial supports from the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong (RGC Reference Number: 15505318). Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2020 Elsevier B.V.",

year = "2020",

month = sep,

doi = "10.1016/j.orl.2020.07.012",

language = "English",

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AU - Li, Qingying

AU - Guo, Pengfei

AU - Wang, Yulan

N1 - Funding Information: The first author Qingying Li was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under the grant no. 71871052 , 71832001 , the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities, China , and DHU Distinguished Young Professor Program, China . The second author Pengfei Guo was supported in part by the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong under grant no. 15506417 . The third author Yulan Wang acknowledges the financial supports from the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong (RGC Reference Number: 15505318 ). Funding Information: The first author Qingying Li was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under the grant no. 71871052, 71832001, the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities, China, and DHU Distinguished Young Professor Program, China. The second author Pengfei Guo was supported in part by the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong under grant no. 15506417. The third author Yulan Wang acknowledges the financial supports from the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong (RGC Reference Number: 15505318). Publisher Copyright: © 2020 Elsevier B.V.

PY - 2020/9

Y1 - 2020/9

N2 - We investigate equilibrium queueing strategies in an unobservable M∕M∕n non-preemptive priority queue with homogeneous customers. Arriving customers make decisions by choosing one of the three options: balking, joining the regular queue, or joining the priority queue with an additional fee. We adopt a sequential approach to analyze this two-dimensional queueing game. We first obtain the equilibrium choice between joining the priority or the regular queue given a fixed total joining rate, and then we determine the equilibrium total joining rate.

AB - We investigate equilibrium queueing strategies in an unobservable M∕M∕n non-preemptive priority queue with homogeneous customers. Arriving customers make decisions by choosing one of the three options: balking, joining the regular queue, or joining the priority queue with an additional fee. We adopt a sequential approach to analyze this two-dimensional queueing game. We first obtain the equilibrium choice between joining the priority or the regular queue given a fixed total joining rate, and then we determine the equilibrium total joining rate.

KW - Equilibrium analysis

KW - Priority queue

KW - Strategic queueing

KW - Unobservable queue

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VL - 48

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EP - 681

JO - Operations Research Letters

JF - Operations Research Letters

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ER -

Equilibrium analysis of unobservable M∕M∕n priority queues with balking and homogeneous customers

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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