Abstract
In this paper, we analyze how carbon emissions affect the selection of transportation modes and social welfare by using a two-stage Stackelberg gaming model. Based on this model, the government's optimal carbon-emission tax scheme and the company's optimal transportation mode and production decisions are explored. We find that: 1) whether or not the transport carbon-emission tax can increase social welfare depends on the relationships among the social cost of carbon (SCC), the transportation mode shifting threshold (TMST), and the biggest carbon-emission tax that a company can afford (BCRA); 2) a greater SCC implies a higher probability of improving social welfare via imposing transportation carbon-emission tax; and 3) a smaller TMST or BCRA yields a higher probability of improving social welfare when a carbon-emission tax is imposed. Further study shows that imposing a carbon-emission tax on the product with a higher production cost, a bigger product volume, or a bigger product density can increase the probability of improving social welfare.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 7109929 |
| Pages (from-to) | 1413-1423 |
| Number of pages | 11 |
| Journal | IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems |
| Volume | 45 |
| Issue number | 11 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Nov 2015 |
Keywords
- Carbon-emission tax
- economic systems
- social welfare
- supply chain management
- sustainability
- Transportation mode selection
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Software
- Control and Systems Engineering
- Human-Computer Interaction
- Computer Science Applications
- Electrical and Electronic Engineering