Dynamic Double-sided Rolling-Horizon Auction Mechanisms for Additive Manufacturing Collaboration in Social Manufacturing

The fusion of Social Manufacturing (SM) and Additive Manufacturing (AM) has led to the emergence of distributed and cooperative production models, where prosumers seamlessly transition between the roles of producers and consumers. However, existing manufacturing-sharing platforms often struggle to accommodate the bidirectional, dynamic, and long-term collaborative requirements inherent to AM. We first design an one-shot double-sided VCG auction mechanism, ensuring incentive compatibility, allocative efficiency and individual rationality. To support long-term and adaptive AM collaboration, this study design two rolling-horizon auction mechanisms: (1) a greedy algorithm-driven approach, which iteratively assigns AM orders by utilizing short-term price variations, and (2) a heuristic-based auction, which reformulates the collaborative manufacturing problem as a Maximum Weighted Independent Set (MWIS) problem, solved using a hybrid Iterated Local Search (ILS) heuristic. To assess the effectiveness of these mechanisms, we conduct a numerical experiment, demonstrating their capability to enhance AM resource efficiency and foster collaborative production.