Abstract
The relationship between contract completeness and partner opportunism is widely discussed in prior interfirm governance literature. However, consensus is lacking regarding whether contract completeness increases ex post opportunism, or such opportunism can be curtailed by contractual or social governance. We believe such an inconclusive state is due to insufficient demarcation between different types of opportunism, and temporal deployment of contracts. In this study, we argue that ex ante contract completeness reduces ex post strong form opportunism while increasing weak form opportunism in a curvilinear manner. Moreover, ex post contractual punishment alleviates the negative impact of strong form opportunism on cooperation performance but worsens the effect of weak form opportunism. Conversely, ex post social punishment alleviates the negative impact of weak form opportunism, suggesting a match between forms of opportunism and types of punishment. Data collected from 227 firms with interfirm cooperation experiences confirm most of the hypotheses. Our findings advance the understanding about contract design and the use of governance mechanisms in interfirm relationships.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | THE ATHENS INSTITUTE FOR EDUCATION AND RESEARCH Abstract Book |
Publisher | Athens Institute for Education and Research |
ISBN (Print) | 978-960-598-351-2 |
Publication status | Published - Jun 2020 |
Event | 18th Annual International Conference on Marketing - Online, Athens, Greece Duration: 29 Jun 2020 → 2 Jul 2020 Conference number: 18 |
Conference
Conference | 18th Annual International Conference on Marketing |
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Country/Territory | Greece |
City | Athens |
Period | 29/06/20 → 2/07/20 |