Does CEO duality constrain board independence? Some evidence from audit pricing

Mark Anthony Gerard Bliss

Research output: Journal article publicationJournal articleAcademic researchpeer-review

49 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This study examines whether CEO duality affects the association between board independence and demand for higher quality audits, proxied by audit fee. The findings show that there is a positive association between board independence and audit fees. This result is consistent with findings of Carcello (2002) that more independent boards demand higher audit quality and effort. However, this positive association is only present in firms without CEO duality, thus suggesting that CEO duality constrains board independence. The results support recommendations against CEO duality by showing that dominant CEOs may compromise the independence of their board of directors. Additionally, evidence is provided that board size (the number of directors on the board) is positively associated with audit fee pricing. This is consistent with prior studies that indicate that larger board sizes are associated with inefficiency and negative firm performance. Accounting and Finance
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)361-380
Number of pages20
JournalAccounting and Finance
Volume51
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2011

Keywords

  • Audit fee pricing
  • Board size
  • Corporate governance
  • G34
  • Independent directors
  • M42

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)

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