Determinants and shareholder wealth effects of the sales method in acquisitions

Frederik Schlingemann, Hong Wu

Research output: Journal article publicationJournal articleAcademic researchpeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We analyze the sales method for a sample of 575 acquisitions announced between 1998 and 2012 and find that targets choose auctions to maximize the target takeover premium through greater competition and to relax their financial constraints. Auctions, compared to negotiated deals, are associated with significantly higher target announcement returns, especially for relatively small targets. Bidder returns are positively related to auctions for bidders acquiring relatively small targets, not for the full sample. Taking into account size differences, we find that auctions, decrease target gains and increase bidder gains expressed in dollars.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)469-485
Number of pages17
JournalJournal of Banking and Finance
Volume59
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Oct 2015

Keywords

  • Acquisitions
  • Auctions
  • Negotiations
  • Sales method

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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