Delivery leadtime and channel structure decisions for make-to-order duopoly under different game scenarios

Tiaojun Xiao, Tsan Ming Choi, Edwin Tai Chiu Cheng

Research output: Journal article publicationJournal articleAcademic researchpeer-review

22 Citations (Scopus)


We develop game-theoretic models to explore the quoted delivery leadtime, price, and channel structure decisions for a make-to-order duopoly system under three game scenarios. Under the integrated-manufacturer first scenario, we find that (i) decentralization of the supply chain increases quoted leadtime; and (ii) both manufacturers may choose different channel structures under symmetric duopoly. By comparing with the symmetric scenario and the retailer first scenario, we find that a manufacturer facing a decentralized rival adopts decentralization when leadtime sensitivity, leadtime cost, and price elasticity are very small; the effect of decentralization on quoted leadtime largely depends on game scenario.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)113-129
Number of pages17
JournalTransportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review
Publication statusPublished - 1 Mar 2016


  • Channel structure
  • Game theory
  • Leadtime
  • Make-to-order manufacturer
  • Strategic decentralization
  • Supply chain management

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business and International Management
  • Civil and Structural Engineering
  • Transportation

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