Cross-listings, antitakeover defenses, and the insulation hypothesis

Albert Tsang, Nan Yang, Lingyi Zheng

Research output: Journal article publicationJournal articleAcademic researchpeer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)


This paper tests a theory conjecturing that cross-listing can insulate firms from potential hostile takeovers owing to the increased cost concern of bidders. We find a significant and positive relation between the corporate control threat and the likelihood that firms cross-list in a foreign country. Firms facing takeover threats are more likely to choose hosting countries with greater accounting differences from the US GAAP. Subsample evidence suggests that cross-listing is more likely to be used as an antitakeover device if firms have foreign market exposure or when all-cash offers are less likely. Tests based on quasi-natural experiments provide further support.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)259-276
Number of pages18
JournalJournal of Financial Economics
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2022


  • Cross-listing
  • Poison pills
  • Takeover deterrent

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Strategy and Management


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