Collusion resistant watermarkable PRFs from standard assumptions

Rupeng Yang, Man Ho Au, Zuoxia Yu, Qiuliang Xu

Research output: Chapter in book / Conference proceedingConference article published in proceeding or bookAcademic researchpeer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A software watermarking scheme can embed a message into a program without significantly changing its functionality. Moreover, any attempt to remove the embedded message in a marked program will substantially change the functionality of the program. Prior constructions of watermarking schemes focus on watermarking cryptographic functions, such as pseudorandom function (PRF), public key encryption, etc. A natural security requirement for watermarking schemes is collusion resistance, where the adversary’s goal is to remove the embedded messages given multiple marked versions of the same program. Currently, this strong security guarantee has been achieved by watermarking schemes for public key cryptographic primitives from standard assumptions (Goyal et al., CRYPTO 2019) and by watermarking schemes for PRFs from indistinguishability obfuscation (Yang et al., ASIACRYPT 2019). However, no collusion resistant watermarking scheme for PRF from standard assumption is known. In this work, we solve this problem by presenting a generic construction that upgrades a watermarkable PRF without collusion resistance to a collusion resistant one. One appealing feature of our construction is that it can preserve the security properties of the original scheme. For example, if the original scheme has security with extraction queries, the new scheme is also secure with extraction queries. Besides, the new scheme can achieve unforgeability even if the original scheme does not provide this security property. Instantiating our construction with existing watermarking schemes for PRF, we obtain collusion resistant watermarkable PRFs from standard assumptions, offering various security properties.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 40th Annual International Cryptology Conference (Crypto 2020),
EditorsDaniele Micciancio, Thomas Ristenpart
PublisherSpringer
Pages590-620
Number of pages31
ISBN (Print)9783030567835
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2020
Externally publishedYes
Event40th Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2020 - Santa Barbara, United States
Duration: 17 Aug 202021 Aug 2020

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume12170 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference40th Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2020
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CitySanta Barbara
Period17/08/2021/08/20

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • General Computer Science

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Collusion resistant watermarkable PRFs from standard assumptions'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this