TY - GEN
T1 - Collusion resistant watermarkable PRFs from standard assumptions
AU - Yang, Rupeng
AU - Au, Man Ho
AU - Yu, Zuoxia
AU - Xu, Qiuliang
N1 - Funding Information:
Acknowledgement. We appreciate the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and especially to one reviewer for suggesting defining collusion resistant unre-movability against adversaries that can adaptively make challenge queries. Part of this work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 61972332, U1636205, 61572294, 61632020), and the Research Grant Council of Hong Kong (Grant No. 25206317).
Publisher Copyright:
© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2020.
PY - 2020
Y1 - 2020
N2 - A software watermarking scheme can embed a message into a program without significantly changing its functionality. Moreover, any attempt to remove the embedded message in a marked program will substantially change the functionality of the program. Prior constructions of watermarking schemes focus on watermarking cryptographic functions, such as pseudorandom function (PRF), public key encryption, etc. A natural security requirement for watermarking schemes is collusion resistance, where the adversary’s goal is to remove the embedded messages given multiple marked versions of the same program. Currently, this strong security guarantee has been achieved by watermarking schemes for public key cryptographic primitives from standard assumptions (Goyal et al., CRYPTO 2019) and by watermarking schemes for PRFs from indistinguishability obfuscation (Yang et al., ASIACRYPT 2019). However, no collusion resistant watermarking scheme for PRF from standard assumption is known. In this work, we solve this problem by presenting a generic construction that upgrades a watermarkable PRF without collusion resistance to a collusion resistant one. One appealing feature of our construction is that it can preserve the security properties of the original scheme. For example, if the original scheme has security with extraction queries, the new scheme is also secure with extraction queries. Besides, the new scheme can achieve unforgeability even if the original scheme does not provide this security property. Instantiating our construction with existing watermarking schemes for PRF, we obtain collusion resistant watermarkable PRFs from standard assumptions, offering various security properties.
AB - A software watermarking scheme can embed a message into a program without significantly changing its functionality. Moreover, any attempt to remove the embedded message in a marked program will substantially change the functionality of the program. Prior constructions of watermarking schemes focus on watermarking cryptographic functions, such as pseudorandom function (PRF), public key encryption, etc. A natural security requirement for watermarking schemes is collusion resistance, where the adversary’s goal is to remove the embedded messages given multiple marked versions of the same program. Currently, this strong security guarantee has been achieved by watermarking schemes for public key cryptographic primitives from standard assumptions (Goyal et al., CRYPTO 2019) and by watermarking schemes for PRFs from indistinguishability obfuscation (Yang et al., ASIACRYPT 2019). However, no collusion resistant watermarking scheme for PRF from standard assumption is known. In this work, we solve this problem by presenting a generic construction that upgrades a watermarkable PRF without collusion resistance to a collusion resistant one. One appealing feature of our construction is that it can preserve the security properties of the original scheme. For example, if the original scheme has security with extraction queries, the new scheme is also secure with extraction queries. Besides, the new scheme can achieve unforgeability even if the original scheme does not provide this security property. Instantiating our construction with existing watermarking schemes for PRF, we obtain collusion resistant watermarkable PRFs from standard assumptions, offering various security properties.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85089715818&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-56784-2_20
DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-56784-2_20
M3 - Conference article published in proceeding or book
AN - SCOPUS:85089715818
SN - 9783030567835
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 590
EP - 620
BT - Proceedings of the 40th Annual International Cryptology Conference (Crypto 2020),
A2 - Micciancio, Daniele
A2 - Ristenpart, Thomas
PB - Springer
T2 - 40th Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2020
Y2 - 17 August 2020 through 21 August 2020
ER -