Coalitional game for community-based autonomous web services cooperation

A. Liu, Qing Li, L. Huang, S. Ying, M. Xiao

Research output: Journal article publicationJournal articleAcademic researchpeer-review

24 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Web services (WSs) can cooperate with each other to provide more valuable WSs. Current approaches for WS cooperation have typically assumed that WSs are always willing to participate in some form of cooperation, and have undermined the fact that WSs are autonomous in this open environment. This assumption, however, becomes more problematic in community-based WS cooperation due to the dynamic nature of WS community. It is, therefore, important to devise a cooperation scheme respecting WS autonomy for community-based WS cooperation. In this paper, we model the community-based cooperation among autonomous WSs as a coalitional game in graph form. We show this game is non-cohesive and design a distributed coalition formation algorithm. We prove that the proposed algorithm can lead to an individually stable coalition partition, which indicates that every WS can maximize its benefit through cooperation without decreasing other WSs' benefit. We also conduct extensive simulations, and the results show that the proposed algorithm can greatly improve the average payoff per WS and average availability per coalition when compared with other cooperation schemes. © 2008-2012 IEEE.
Original languageEnglish
Article number6175002
Pages (from-to)387-399
Number of pages13
JournalIEEE Transactions on Services Computing
Volume6
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 17 Sept 2013
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Autonomy
  • coalitional game theory
  • community
  • composition
  • cooperation
  • web service

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Hardware and Architecture
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Information Systems and Management

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