Clawback adoptions and institutional investment decisions

Kwok Tong Samuel Cheung, Simon Yu Kit Fung, K. K. Raman, Jianfu Shen

Research output: Journal article publicationJournal articleAcademic researchpeer-review

Abstract

We examine whether voluntary adoptions of clawback (executive compensation recovery) provisions are followed by changes in market outcomes, specifically changes in institutional investment decisions. Institutional investors dominate the US capital markets and are generally viewed as informed investors. Using difference-in-differences (DID) research design, we find that clawback adoptions are followed by a decrease (increase) in transient (dedicated) institutional investors' equity holdings. Our findings are robust to both level and change specifications. Also, the decrease (increase) in holdings for transient (dedicated) investors is stronger for adopters who display reduced information asymmetry (increase in long-term orientation) following clawback adoption. The results are robust to several tests for endogeneity and alternative specifications. Collectively, our findings suggest that clawback adoptions make the firm potentially less attractive to transient institutions and more desirable to dedicated institutions. Our findings have implications for clawback adoptions that are now mandatory for all US public companies with an effective date (most recently) of December 1, 2023.

Original languageEnglish
Article number102743
JournalJournal of Corporate Finance
Volume91
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2025

Keywords

  • Executive compensation recovery (clawback)
  • Information asymmetry
  • Institutional investors
  • Long-term orientation
  • Transient/dedicated institutions

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business and International Management
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Strategy and Management

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Clawback adoptions and institutional investment decisions'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this