Abstract
We examine whether voluntary adoptions of clawback (executive compensation recovery) provisions are followed by changes in market outcomes, specifically changes in institutional investment decisions. Institutional investors dominate the US capital markets and are generally viewed as informed investors. Using difference-in-differences (DID) research design, we find that clawback adoptions are followed by a decrease (increase) in transient (dedicated) institutional investors' equity holdings. Our findings are robust to both level and change specifications. Also, the decrease (increase) in holdings for transient (dedicated) investors is stronger for adopters who display reduced information asymmetry (increase in long-term orientation) following clawback adoption. The results are robust to several tests for endogeneity and alternative specifications. Collectively, our findings suggest that clawback adoptions make the firm potentially less attractive to transient institutions and more desirable to dedicated institutions. Our findings have implications for clawback adoptions that are now mandatory for all US public companies with an effective date (most recently) of December 1, 2023.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 102743 |
Journal | Journal of Corporate Finance |
Volume | 91 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Apr 2025 |
Keywords
- Executive compensation recovery (clawback)
- Information asymmetry
- Institutional investors
- Long-term orientation
- Transient/dedicated institutions
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Business and International Management
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics
- Strategy and Management