Can the future be bright? Evolutionary game analysis of multi-stakeholders in the blue and green hydrogen development

Green hydrogen and blue hydrogen play a critical role in mitigating climate change and achieving carbon neutrality. The collaboration between governments and enterprises is essential in determining the trajectory of clean and low-carbon hydrogen production. Consequently, we employ evolutionary game theory to analyze the influence of governmental, market, and technological factors on green and blue hydrogen. Specifically, we examine the scenario where the Chinese government can choose to incentivize either blue hydrogen projects or green hydrogen projects, while energy enterprises decide whether to invest in green or blue hydrogen initiatives. We delve into the factors that determine the costs and benefits for both the government and enterprises, taking into account not only the revenues generated from selling hydrogen energy but also the profits associated with carbon and electricity trading markets. Furthermore, our study considers both static and dynamic incentive scenarios. Building upon these assumptions, we utilize evolutionary game theory to identify the evolutionary stable strategy for each scenario. Subsequently, we conduct a numerical case study to explore the impact of different factors on the evolutionary stable strategy. Based on the findings of the numerical study, we conclude that (1) the dynamic incentive policy scenario is the only context where an evolutionary stable strategy exists; (2) governmental preferences cannot override market-driven actions, even if subsidies are provided for blue and green hydrogen projects; (3) a well-developed carbon market effectively harnesses market power to promote the clean and low-carbon hydrogen production industry; (4) technological breakthroughs serve as catalysts for enterprises to actively invest in the clean and low-carbon hydrogen production industry. Our study proposes relevant policies based on the identified evolutionary stable strategy.